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RELIABILITY'S ROLE IN KEY PROJECT DECISIONS
« - ^
Haggai Cohen
Director: Reliability, Quality and Safety
Office of Manned Space Flight, NASA Hq

Safety Program Requirements
Including Interface Between
Safety and Reliability in
Analysis Area

Tb present a brief -summary of the role
played by reliability in the key project
decision' Making process, this paper is
arranged in an outline form. We will
discuss the Establishment of Early RequireHents, Preliminary FMEA T s During
Conceptual Design, Design Trade-off
Studies and Participation in Baseline
Meetings and Milestone Reviews, Periodic
Beliability Assessment - Long Poles in
the Tent, Selection of Candidates for
Inflight maintenance, Special Reliability
Analyses - Suspected Trouble Areas, Hardware Storage and Refurbishment Problems,
Special Requirements on Experiments,
Reliability Data Base - Functional Notebooks, Utilization of FMEA/SFP Data, and
the "Lessons Learned" Report.

There are additional directives pending
such as Control of Nonflight Hardware
and Mission Support for Resolution of
Flight Anomalies. The experiment general specification collects into a single document, all requirements with
which an experimenter must comply. Program then tailored to suit particular
experiment.
The program philosophy has evolved as
follows:
Qualitative Reliability Goals
Long Duration Mission Approach

EARLY ESTABLISHMENT OF REQUIREMENTS

Wearout Analysis

The AAP R&QA Program Plan (NHB 5300.5 May 1967) was built upon 200-2 and 250-1
documents and incorporated them as part
of the document. It supplemented them
in specific areas such as -

FMEA's and SFP Control
Management Control System for SFP's
Application of FMEA/SFP Summaries
to Mission Operations, Test Operations, Inspection Planning

Data Trend Monitoring
Management Control of Single Failure
Points
Specific program directives providing
more detailed requirements than NHB
5300.5 in selected areas:

QUALITATIVE RELIABILITY GOALS FOR SKYLAB

We expect identification of failure
modes, for various modes of operation,
the categorization of failure modes by
criticality and the establishment of
explicit test and/or analysis requirements pertaining to category 1 and 2
modes. The establishment of contingency
procedures for all category 1 and 2
failure modes will be requirement.

Reliability, Quality and Safety
Auditing
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
and Single Failure Point Identification and Control
Nonconformance Reporting and
Corrective Action

Our goal is that no single failure will
cause the loss of any crew member, prevent the continuation of the mission, or
prevent a successful early termination
of the mission.

Control of Non-metallic Materials
Program Milestone Review Requirements
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Prior flight and/or ground tests will
have demonstrated that system elements
are capable of meeting the mission requirements (including any special requirements associated with early
termination). For those system elements
which will not have been fully verified
by prior flight and/or ground tests,
engineering analyses will substantiate
their capability of meeting mission requirements.

1. Abrasion (e.g., ball bearings,
sliding contacts).
2. Mechanical deformation (e.g.,
teflon cold flow).
3.

Corrosion.

4. Radiation (e.g., degradation of
electronic components).
5.

Failed parts analyses and corrective
action, as appropriate, will have been
accomplished for all failures experienced
during the testing programs.

Electrolysis.

6. Chemical incompatibility (e.g.,
battery fluids, propellants).
7. Vacuum (e.g., change in materials
characteristics caused by outgassing).

The establishment of design margins/
safety margins for all mission critical
parameters is a goal for Skylab.

FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS SINGLE
FAILURE POINT IDENTIFICATION & CONTROL
LONG DURATION APPROACH

Requirements:
Apollo common hardware is qualified to
14 days. Skylab will not requalify
hardware for longer mission duration
lifetimes except in cases where operation is critical to crew safety. Skylab
will operate on "open-ended" mission
concept assured by:

1. Accomplishment of FMEA T s for all
Skylab flight and flight support equipment .
2.

Identification and analysis of SFP's.

A. Reliability analysis for weaklink identification.

3. Reporting of category 1 and 2 SFP's
(and rationale for retention) at major
program milestones.

B. Assessment of past demonstrated
test performance compared to Skylab mission operating requirements and environments.

4. Establishment of a management control system to minimize impact of SFP's
on crew safety and accomplishment of
mission objectives.

C.

Wearout analysis.

D.

Redundant design.

E.

Inflight maintenance.

5. Establishment of contingency/emergency procedures for category 1 and 2
SFP f s.
6. Furnishing FMEA/SFP results to test
planning as a primary consideration for
test emphasis.

WEAROUT ANALYSIS
MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM FOR SFP'S

Definition: Wearout will be considered
to be present for any element or component whose likelihood or failure with
time is expected to rise significantly
prior to the end of the mission.

Maintained by CCB controlled baseline listing of SFP's for stage/
module by subsystem
Begins at preliminary design review

Approach: Wearout analysis shall cover
the equipment required to operate during
Skylab mission to the specified lifetimes. List the environments that cause
wearout, examine each element or component to determine which environments may
affect its life, determine if life expectancy falls short of requirements,
and recommend corrective actions for
those that fall short. The environments
to be considered shall include but not
be limited to the following:

Lists updated as design changes
occur
CCB's charged with screening of
ECP f s for SFP impact
Submitted for approval at major
program milestone reviews
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TYPICAL SELECTED TRADE STUDIES

APPLICATION OF FMEA AND SFP TO MISSION
OPERATIONS

—— CMG Life/Reliability Effects
of a 14% Increase in Wheel
Speed

Reliability analyses are used to support
preparation of mission rules. SFP's de
fined contingencies which must be ac
counted for in alternate mode operation
and abort planning. These engineering
studies make a significant input into
in-flight fault isolation procedures.

—— Applicability of OAMS Anomaly
to Skylab TAGS
—— TAGS Isolation Study
—— Skylab 1/2 Critical One Shot
Functions

APPLICATION OF FMEA AND SFP SUMMARIES
TO TEST OPERATIONS

—— Attitude Pointing and Control
System - Independent Reli
ability Assessment

Used to select items to be tested
Establish operational modes to be
tested

—-- Comparison of Failure Rates
of Rate Gyro and CMG Sub
systems

Determine frequency of monitoring

—— SRA - AM Condensing Heat
Exchanger

Determine overall test emphasis
Use test data to update FMEA's
and SFP summary

—— SRA - Star Tracker Shutter
Operations
—— SRA - EDCR 0146, DRL No.
A3304

APPLICATION OF FMEA AND SFP SUMMARIES
TO INSPECTION PLANNING

—— SRA - Inertial Reference
Integrating Gyro Life

Determine areas worthy of special
skill training and certification
Determine critical procedural
steps requiring inspection moni
toring

RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT
Reliability Assessment is a minimal
effort on Skylab. It is used primarily
during design trade-offs as a relative
evaluator on selected areas. Overall
assessment is used to show long poles
in tent for additional emphasis re
quired. No formal system in place or
required for continuing assessment.
Primary emphasis is on FMEA/SFP con
trols.

Determine mandatory inspection
points
Determine where detailed log
steps for these mandatory in
spection points are required
PRELIMINARY FMEA'S AND TRADE-OFF STUDIES
DURING DESIGN BASELINING

CANDIDATES FOR INFLIGHT MAINTENANCE

Early requirement spelled out preliminary FMEA and SFP at PDR.
Most major modules and many ex
periments managed to comply.
Served as valuable tool during
review and most of the detailed
discussions at review centered
on elimination of SFP's.

Known problems from wearout
analysis (e.g., partial pressure
oxygen sensor, molecular sieve,
charcoal canisters, etc.)
Multiple use items which can be
easily interchanged from one
location to another (e.g.,
lights, circulating fans)

Typical kinds of trade-studies
performed.
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Remote Emergencies

10. Interchangeability of fans throughout
the cluster has been designed into the
EGS. Interchangeability between the
cluster fans and the CM fans is ques
tioned.

Patching kit for meteoroid
puncture
Tool kit for wiring or plumbing
repairs

HARDWARE STORAGE AND REFURBISHMENT

SPECIAL RELIABILITY ANALYSES - SUSPECTED/
KNOWN TROUBLE AREAS
High Energy Source Study - Apollo 13
Equipment Functional Interchange
Study - Apollo 13
Contamination Study Efforts - Outgassing of Materials and Spacecraft
Venting Affecting Optics
Problems of High Pressure GOX and
Fuel Systems Resulting From Apollo
13 Investigations
Skylab Functional Analysis Important Data Base for Further
Analysis

The program is using residual Apollo
flight hardware now in long term
storage - SIB's, Saturn V's, I.U.'s,
etc. Wearout analyses determined
preparation for long term storage
(corrosion control, removal for sepa
rate storage, etc.). Storage life
determinations dictate refurbishment
test re-validation requirements and
determines replacement hardware early
in procurement cycle to avoid later
problems. It also determines mainte
nance procedures during storage to
minimize degradation.
EXPERIMENT DEVELOPMENT GUIDELINES
Obj ectives:

EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONAL INTERCHANGE STUDY

For experiments assigned to
Skylab and new experiments:

1. Has the interchangeable use of both
high and low power electrical sources
been maximized between the modules?

1.

Reduce development costs

2.

Reduce development rigor
where possible

2. Are gaseous power sources switchable
between the modules and CSM? Are common
disconnects used in these systems?

Approach:
Develop experiments in accord
with effect on:

3. Are the 02 and N2 sources common
usage throughout the cluster?
4. Can telemetry and communications
systems within the CSM be restored with
cluster components?
5. Will existing hand tools be adequate
to handle such repairs as wire splicing,
crimping, cutting and connector assembly?
6. Can the IU be retained in the cluster
as a backup computer?

1.

Crew safety

2.

Mission objectives

3.

Carrier integration com
plexity

4.

None of above

EXPERIMENT DEVELOPMENT GUIDELINES

7. Will water guns and associated hoses
be common in the CM and OWS?

Provide four categories of
experiments:

8. Has battery interchangeability and
battery jury-rigging within the cluster
been fully evaluated?

Experiments which, can, affect
crew safety
Experiments which can, affect
mission obj ecti v es

9. Will the drinking water guns in the
OWS wardroom be compatible with the
reconstitutable food bags?

Experiments 'which, have carrier
i n tegra t ion comp1 exit y
Experiments which have .none
of the above
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II.

DEVELOPMENT GUIDELINES FOR EXPERIMENTS
THAT HAVE ELEMENTS THAT AFFECT CREW
SAFETY

Requirement for submission and review of
I.

III.

Design and Development

IV.

FMEA*
Parts/Materials Listing*
Failure & Corrective Action
Reports*
Status Reports*
Design Reviews*

DEVELOPMENT GUIDELINES FOR EXPERIMENTS
THAT HAVE CARRIER INTEGRATION COMPLEXITY

Requirements for submission and review
of:
I.

Integration

Hardware
Mockup(s) or Test Article(s)
Flight Article
GSE

*Limited to that needed to
assure physical/functional
interface integrity and
assess availability of
hardware.

Operations
Crew Operations Requirements
Training Unit
Experiment Data Requirements

Requirement for information
on crew safety and mission
objective impact assessment
(essentially a minimal FMEA
for identification of poten
tial hazards - high pressure
bottles, toxicity, flammability, ignition sources,
sharp elements, highly
stressed springs, etc.)

DEVELOPMENT GUIDELINES FOR EXPERIMENTS
THAT AFFECT ACCOMPLISHMENT OF MISSION
OBJECTIVES
Requirement for submission and review of:
I.

Design and Development
Specifications
Drawings and Schematics*
Configuration Control*
Status Reviews*
Design Reviews*

Interface Requirements
Checkout Requirements

IV.

Operations
Crew Operations Requirements
Training Unit
Experiment Data Requirements

*Limited to the experiment
elements that affect crew
safety contents tailored
to individual experiment
needs.

III.

Hardware
Mockup(s) or Test Article(s)
Flight Article
GSE

Specifications*
Test Plans*
R&QA and Safety Plans*

II.

Integration
Interface Requirements
Checkout Requirements

Design and Development

Note: Skylab program is re
sponsible for packaging and
servicing to isolate experi
ment failures from on-board
systems.

Specifications
Development Plans
R&QA and Safety Plans
Test Plans
Drawings & Schematics
FMEA

II.

Parts and Materials Listing
Configuration Control
Failures and Corrective
Action Reports
Status Reviews and/or Reports
Cost Reports
Design Reviews

Integration
Interface Requirements
Checkout Requirements

III.

Hardware
Mockup(s) or Test Article(s)
Flight Article
GSE Hardware and Requirements

Note: Contents of above tai
lored to individual experiment
needs.
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IV.

Operations

CRITERIA FOR ASSIGNMENT TO "NONE OF THE
ABOVE"

Crew Operations Requirements
Training Unit
Experiment Data Requirements

Experiment hardware which:
1. Have no failure modes that jeopar
dize crew safety

CRITERIA FOR ASSIGNMENT TO CARRIER
INTEGRATION COMPLEXITY

2. Have no failure modes that prevent
accomplishment of mission objectives

Experiments that cannot be deleted,
removed or deactivated without signifi
cantly affecting carrier checkout test
operations or accomplishment of mission
objectives are said to have carrier
integration complexity. Their unavail
ability or deletion would require sig
nificant simulation of some type to
allow carrier buildup and checkout
operations to proceed.
DEVELOPMENT
THAT DO NOT
OBJECTIVES,
INTEGRATION

I.

3. Carrier integration and interface
not complex (i.e., removed or deacti
vated without affecting flight module
checkout operations or accomplishment
of mission objectives.)
4. Successful operation of experiment
hardware sole responsibility of experi
ment developer. (NASA provides flight
opportunity)

GUIDELINES FOR EXPERIMENTS
AFFECT CREW SAFETY, MISSION
AND DO NOT HAVE CARRIER
COMPLEXITY

RELIABILITY FUNCTIONAL NOTEBOOKS

Purpose: To serve as a basic instru
ment (tool) to be used by the con
tractor^ reliability engineers in the
performance of independent reliability
assessments to support Headquarters in
the identification, tracking and reso
lution of the Skylab Reliability Areas
of Concern (RAC f s).

Design and Development
No requirement for review or
approval of specifications,
tests, R&QA procedures, plans,
configuration control, drawings,
schematics, status reports,
formal reviews and related docu
mentation.

Intent: To be an informal compilation
of the complete Skylab reliability
working knowledge such that Skylab
RAC T s can be handled on a real time
basis.

Requirement for information on
crew safety and mission objective
impact assessment (include min.
FMEA) (potential hazards—high
pressure bottles, toxicity,
flammability, ignition sources,
sharp elements, highly stressed
springs, etc.)

MANDATORY FUNCTIONAL NOTEBOOK DATA
INCLUSION

1. Brief system definitions (extrapo
late from system definition documents)

Note: Skylab program is re
sponsible for packaging and
servicing to isolate experiment
failures from on-board systems.
II.

2. Concise functional descriptions
(extrapolated from system definition
documents)

Integration
, Interface Requirements
Checkout Requirements

III.

IV.

3.

Functional logic diagrams

4.

Single point failure summaries

5. Significant failure and corrective
action histories

Hardware
Flight Article
GSE

6. Reliability goals (qualitative or
quantitative)

Operations

7.

Reliability Areas of Concern

Crew Operations Requirements
Training Unit (if essential)
Experiment Data Requirements

8.

Reliability problems

9. Chronological record of system
changes and the associated logic
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10. A description of the system's opera
ting parameters (i.e., pressures, volt
ages, etc.) and margins (safety consum
ables* etc.)
11. A description of the systems function
along with a time line showing "on"
times, passive stages, etc.
12. Significant interface considerations
13. Life limitation/mission considera
tions
SUPPLEMENTARY FUNCTIONAL NOTEBOOK DATA
INCLUSIONS

(Guidelines left to discretion of indi
vidual engineer)
1. FMEA's for major subsystems or
components.
2. Schematics for major subsystems or
components.
3. Any additional drawings and sche
matics necessary for clarification of
the system or components.

meetings. This technical background is
in the following areas:
1. Validating review data packages
2. Technical preparation for partici
pation
3. Technical preparation for making
inputs
4. Baseline comparison of the review
and results
The functional notebooks are then up
dated in accordance with the review
results and applicable portions of the
data packages.
"LESSONS LEARNED" REPORT

Deliberate plan to collect:
Significant Problems
Significant Occurrences
Accident/Incident Descriptions
Evaluation of Management Techniques

4. Program schedules related to func
tion (PDR's, CDR's, meetings, etc.)

Checkout History - Effectiveness of
Testing Plan
Workmanship Summary - Effectiveness
of Inspection Effort

SPECIAL ANALYSES

The functional notebooks allow, when
requested by Headquarters, special
analyses to be performed and documented
to aid Headquarters in the review, Skylab
evaluation, and monitoring of the
program. These analyses will be in the
form of:
1.

Special Studies

2.

Trade-off Studies

3.

Problem Analysis

For use on future programs, pre-planning
will hopefully produce well organized
material in simple checklist format.

4. Reliability Requirement/Goal Defi
nitions
5. Reliability Assessments Evaluations
The special analyses then are utilized
to update the functional notebooks.
MEETING SUPPORT (MILESTONE REVIEWS,
TECHNICAL REVIEWS, INTERCENTER PANELS)

The functional notebooks provide the
technical background whereby support
can be provided at milestone reviews,
technical reviews and intercenter panel
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